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LAWRENCE MACDONNELL*

Federal Interests in Western Water
Resources:
Conflict and Accommodation
ABSTRACT
Federalinterests in water have expanded considerably during this
century, challenging traditionalstate primacy in the control of water
resources. This paper tracesthe development of these major interests
and considers ways in which federal programs and policies can be
accommodated with sometimes conflicting state interests.
INTRODUCTION

Federal laws and activities affecting the development and use of water
have expanded rapidly in this century. In some instances this expansion
has caused conflicts with state and private interests in water. These conflicts have been the subject of a now sizeable literature.' Most of the'
early conflict involved disputes over use of navigable waters and the reach
of federal authority.2 Additional conflicts developed as the federal gov-

ernment became increasingly involved in water development activities
through the Bureau of Reclamation, the Corps of Engineers, and the
Federal Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-

mission (FERC)). Still other conflicts have arisen out of the reservation
of water for use on certain federal and Indian lands. More recently, federal

regulatory controls aimed at environmental protection have come into
conflict with traditional water uses.
As a general matter, private rights to the use of water are determined
by state law? Federal involvement in water matters derives primarily
from its broad interest in interstate commerce (including navigation) and
*Director, Natural Resources Law Center. University of Colorado School of Law. The valuable
research assistance of Steven Jeffers, class of 1988, is gratefully acknowledged.
I. See, e.g., Martz, The Role of the Federal Government in State Water Law, 5 KAN. L. REV.
626 (1957); Morreale, Federal-State Rights and Relations, in 2 R. CLARK, WAT Rs AND WATER
RIGHTS (1967); Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Law, 10 BuFYALO L. REV. 399 (1961)
[hereinafter Federal Limitations); Trelease, Uneasy Federalism-State Water Laws and National Water
Uses, 55 WASH. L. REV. 751 (1980); Note, Federal-State Conflicts Over the Control of Western
Waters, 60 CoLUM. L. REV. 967 (1960).
2. See Starr, Navigable Waters of the United States-State and National Control, 35 HARv. L.
REV. 154 (1921).
3. In Kansas v. Colorado the Supreme Court said: "Congress cannot enforce either rule [riparian
or prior appropriation] upon any state," 206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907). See also Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Federal Limitations on State Water Law. supra note 1,at 399.
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its role as manager of the public lands. The constitutional authority of
Congress to enact laws displacing state water rules is no longer a matter
of serious debate. Rather, attention is now focused on whether Congress,
in existing enactments, intended to displace state law, and the degree to
which Congress should displace state law in new legislation.
The western states are especially sensitive to these matters because
they believe that their control of limited water resources in their arid
areas is essential for their development. Yet clearly there is more, not
less, federal involvement in decisions regarding water use. This federal
involvement is driving changes in the water laws of the western states
as they adjust in an effort to maintain control.'
This paper traces the development of federal laws and activities in the
water area and the conflicts that have arisen with state and private interests.
Special emphasis is placed on the more recent conflicts involving federal
regulatory interests.
FEDERAL LAWS AND ACTIVITIES
Water-Development Related
Navigation
In 1824, the United States Supreme Court determined that the power
over interstate commerce, enumerated as belonging to the federal government in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, included control over
navigable waterways. 5 Federal interest centered primarily on protecting
and improving navigation on these "public highways." 6 The Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899' required federal permission for the construction of
any bridge, dam, dike, or causeway in any navigable water of the United
States.
The reach of the federal regulatory authority under the navigation power
initially was restricted to "navigable waters." In 1870, the Supreme Court
defined navigable waters as those that "are used, or are susceptible of
being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways of commerce." ' By
1940 this definition had been broadened to include waterways that could
be used if "reasonable improvements" were made. 9 Moreover, the Court
4. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 317 (1985).
5. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 84 (1824).
6. The Act of May 18, 1796, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 468, §9, stated that "all navigable rivers, within
the territory to be disposed of by virtue of this act, shall be deemed to be, and remain public
highways."
7. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, §9, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
8. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1871).
9. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power, 311 U.S. 377, 406 (1940).
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had determined that federal authority could extend to non-navigable reaches
if downstream navigability were affected."0
To a considerable degree, the navigation power has been subsumed by
the larger commerce power. " As the federal government began undertaking larger water projects with multiple purposes, only one of which
was navigation, the basis for its authority was easily expanded. 2 Nevertheless, the navigation power remains an important basis for federal regulatory authority. As one writer has summarized it:
Once navigation purposes are present, Congress may in effect use
the waters of both navigable and nonnavigable streams for whatever
purposes and in whatever manner it wishes. In so doing, it can
completely override any state water plan. It can prevent, in toto,
state law from being applied to "federal" waters; or, on a lesser
scale, it can prevent state law from being applied to federal waters
in
a particular situation where its application conflicts with the federal
interest.13
Reclamation
The Reclamation Act of 1902'" dedicated the proceeds of public land
sales in the western states to the support of the construction of irrigation
works. The full cost of construction was to be repaid within ten years by
those receiving project water. The reclamation program has undergone
considerable expansion and change over the years."
10. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & trrigation Co., 174 US. 690 (1899). An irrigation
company proposed to construct a dam on the nonnavigable Rio Grande within the New Mexico
Territory and to appropriate all of the unappropriated flow at that point for irrigation. The federal
government objected to that proposed use and sought an injunction, claiming it would destroy
navigability on the river downstream. The Court recognized a federal power superior to that of the
states to secure the uninterrupted navigability of all navigable waters within the United States. In
dicta, the Court also acknowledged the right of the federal government to the continued flow of
waters bordering or flowing through federal lands in the amount necessary for the beneficial uses
of those lands. Id. at 703.
i1.A somewhat unique aspect of the federal exercise of its navigation power is that certain
private property fights taken thereby need not be compensated. For a thorough discussion see
Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of No Compensation,
3 NAT. REs. J. I (1963). The basis for this so-called "navigation servitude" is not entirely clear
but the effect has been to permit the federal government to engage in activities affecting navigable
waters in a manner reducing private property values without payment of compensation.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); Oklahoma ex rel.
Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
13. Morreale, supra note I, at 11.
14. Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 372-620).
15. 2 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHrs 121 (1967). Additional articles discussing the
changes of the reclamation programs since 1902 include: Huffaker & Gardner, The "'Hammer"
Clause of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, 26 NAT. REs. J. 41, 43-44 (1986); Sax, Problems
of Federalism in Reclamation Law, 37 U. CoLO. L. REV. 49 (1964); Trelease, Reclamation Water
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During the 1930s and 1940s, the federal government assumed a much
larger role in the development of water projects. Several decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court have dealt with conflicts between federal reclamation
law and state law arising out of the development of the massive Central
Valley Project in California. At issue in UnitedStates v. Gerlach Livestock
Co. was the loss of certain state-created water rights because of diversions
resulting from construction of a dam. 6 The Court required the payment
of compensation by the federal government for the loss of these rights,
citing section 8 of the Reclamation Act which states:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to
affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory
relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water
used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the
Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act,
shall proceed in conformity with such laws ..... 17
In Ivanhoe IrrigationDistrict v. McCracken,"8 the Supreme Court upheld the imposition of the 160-acre limitation provision under section 5
of the Reclamation Act against a challenge that California law did not
permit such provisions.' 9 In this situation, the Court found that section
5 "is a specific and mandatory prerequisite laid down by the Congress
..." Nothing in
as binding in the operation of reclamation projects.
section 8 was found to "override the repeatedly reaffirmed national policy
of § 5."2

In City of Fresno v. California,2 2 the Court rejected a challenge to the
ability of the federal government to acquire water rights needed for the
development of the Central Valley Project through exercise of its power
of eminent domain. Indeed the Court stated that "the effect of § 8 in such
Rights, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 464 (1960); Comment, The Reclamation ReformAct of 1982: Reform
or Replacement?, 45 U. Pirr. L. REv. 647, 648-54 (1984).
16. 339 U.S. 725 (1950). Also of interest in this decision was the holding that the constitutional
authority for the reclamation program flowed from the power to spend for the general welfare. In
so doing the Court moved easily beyond the idea that such federal activities are tied to the navigation
power, or even the commerce power. Id. at 738,
17. 43 U.SC. §383 (1982) (cited in Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. at 734).
18. 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
19. Under the Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388, project water could not be sold
for use on lands held by one individual in excess of 160 acres. Each owner was required to live on
or near the irrigated land, After enactment of the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926, ch. 383, 44
Stat. 636 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1982)), the Secretary of the Interior could deny
irrigation project water to participants who refused to dispose of excess lands. These excess lands
were to be sold under recordable contract, generally within ten years, for a price excluding use of
project waters. Once the contract was entered into, the excess lands could receive project waters
until sold. Lands leased were not considered in the 160-acre limitation.
20, Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist., 357 U.S. at 291.
21. Id. at 292.
22. 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
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a case is to leave to state law the definition of the property interests, if
any, for which compensation must be made." 23
In the 1978 case of California v. United States, 24 the Supreme Court
considered the meaning of section 8 at great length. At issue was whether
the California State Water Resources Control Board could attach numerous conditions to its permit granting water rights to the United States
Bureau of Reclamation, as part of the Central Valley Project. Among the
25 conditions attached to the permit were ones requiring a demonstrated
use of the water prior to its taking, requiring that a preference be given
to water users in the basin of origin, requiring certain releases to be made
in order to maintain water quality and protect fish and wildlife, and
reserving the right in the Board to add other conditions if necessary. 5
Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist began by noting that "[tihe
history of the relationship between the Federal Government and the States
in the reclamation of the arid lands of the Western States is both long
and involved, but through it runs the consistent thread of purposeful and
continued deference to state water law by Congress."'26 The opinion distinguishes the Ivanhoe and City of Fresno decisions by noting that specific
provisions of the Reclamation Act were involved. It adds:
§ 8 cannot be read to require the Secretary to comply with state law
only when it becomes necessary to purchase or condemn vested
rights. That section does, of course, provide for the protection of
vested water rights, but it also requires the Secretary to comply with
state law in the "control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water."
Nor, as the United States contends, does § 8 merely require the
Secretary of the Interior to file a notice with the State of his intent
to appropriate but to thereafter ignore the substantive provisions of
state law. The legislative history of the Reclamation Act of 1902
makes it abundantly clear that Congress intended to defer to the
substance, as well as the form, of state water law. The Government's
interpretation would trivialize the broad language and purpose of
§ 8.27

In each of these cases, a fundamental issue has been the extent to which
the implementation of the federal reclamation programs may intrude on
state water law. A major consideration has been the meaning of the section
8 disclaimer. The 1978 California v. United States decision gives great
weight to this provision and suggests that deference to state water law
should be the general presumption. To overcome this presumption it is
23. Id. at 630.
24. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
25, Id. at 652 & n.8.

26, Id. at 653.
27. Id. at 674-75.
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necessary to show the specific intent of Congress to do so.
The history of the Reclamation Act suggests that there is a strong basis
upon which to rest this analysis. The driving force behind passage of this
law was the strong desire to settle the West and make it a more productive
part of the national economy. The prime movers were westerners who
recognized that federal financial and other support was needed to build
water storage and distribution projects that the states themselves and
private interests in the states had not been able to build.2" The only
distinctly federal purpose in the Reclamation Act was a weak one which
soon became incidental-that was to irrigate lands still part of the public
domain in order to make them more attractive for settlement and purchase.
In this context the general policy of deferral to state water law in reclamation projects stands clear.
Hydropower
With the passage of the Federal Water Power Act of 1920,9 Congress
established federal control over the use of navigable waters for electric
power generation. No hydroelectric projects may be constructed without
a federal license. Licenses are to be granted only if the proposed project
is found to be:
[Blest adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing
a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign
commerce, for the improvement and utilization of water-power development, for the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement
of fish and wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat),
and for other beneficial public uses, including irrigation, flood control, water supply, and recreation and other purposes. .. ."
The state role in this federal program was at issue in the 1946 case,
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission."
This case involved a license application for the construction of a hydroelectric facility which was opposed by the state of Iowa because the
project as proposed would violate state law. 2 The project was to divert
28. See, e.g., the discussion in D. WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE at 156-69 (1985). "It was, let
no one misunderstand, a proposal that came out of the West, devised by a western politician and
promoted by a well-oiled and well-funded western lobby that had been organized by a native son
of the golden West." id.at 160.
29. Act of June 10, 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (codilied as amended by the Public Utility Act
of 1935, at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823 (1982)).
30. 16 U.S.C. 803(a) (Supp. 1988).
31. 328 US. 152 (1946).
32. Iowa law established a licensing program for "mill dams and races" which included the
requirement that "any water taken from the stream in connection with the project [must be] returned
thereto at the nearest practicable place ....
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop., 328 U.S at 164-66.
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"substantially all" of the waters of the Cedar River and return these
waters to the Mississippi River." Section 9(b) of the Federal Power Act
requires that each license applicant provide "[s]atisfactory evidence that
the applicant has complied with the requirements of the laws of the State
or States within which the proposed project is to be located with respect
to bed and banks and to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water
for power purposes. . .. " Moreover, section 27 provides:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as affecting or
intending to affect or in any way interfere with the laws of the
respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses,
or any vested right acquired therein."
In rather sweeping language, the Supreme Court rejected the need for
the applicant to obtain a state permit. It stated:
To require the petitioner to secure the actual grant to it of a state
permit under [Iowa law] as a condition precedent to securing a federal
license for the same project under the Federal Power Act would vest
in the Executive Council of Iowa a veto power over the federal
project. Such a veto power easily could destroy the effectiveness of
the Federal Act. It would subordinate to the control of the State the
"comprehensive" planning which the Act provides shall depend upon
the judgment of the Federal Power Commission or other representatives of the Federal Government.36
Thus the Iowa law was found to be preempted by the comprehensive
scheme of control established by the Federal Power Act.
Despite considerable criticism of the apparent breadth of this holding,3 7
the courts have continued to follow the lead of First Iowa in permitting
federal licenses to proceed without regard for more restrictive state provisions.3" FederalPower Commission v. Oregon39 involved an objection
by the state of Oregon to licensing a project on reserved federal lands,
the facilities for which would not comply with Oregon law regarding
33. Id. at 166.
34. 16 U.S.C. §802 (1982).
35. Id. at 802.
36. FirstIowa Hydro-Electric Coop., 328 U.S. at 164.
37. See, e.g., Whittaker, The Federal Power Act and Hydropower Development: Rediscovering
State Regulatory Powers and Responsibilities, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 135 (1986); Wolfe, Hydropower: FERC Licensing and Emerging State-Federal Water Rights Conflicts, 29 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 851 (1983); Comment, HydroelectricPower, the FederalPowerAct, and State Water
Laws: Is FederalPreemption Water Over the Dam?, 17 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1179 (1984).
38, See cases collected in Comment, supra note 37, at 1197 n.91.
39. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
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protection of anadromous fish.' Emphasizing the explicit authorization
in the Federal Power Act to license projects on federal lands, the Supreme
Court concluded:
There thus remains no question as to the constitutional and statutory
authority of the Federal Power Commission to grant a valid license
for a power project on reserved lands of the United States, provided
that, as required by the Act, the use of the water does not conflict
with vested rights of others. To allow Oregon to veto such use, by
requiring the State's additional permission, would result in the very
duplication of regulatory control precluded by the First Iowa decision.... No such duplication of authority is called for by the Act."
In California v. FederalPower Commission,42 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld a condition imposed by the Federal Power Commission
in granting a license which required the maintenance of specified minimum stream flows for the protection of salmon runs. The project being
licensed involved two irrigation districts whose state-created water rights
would potentially be affected by this license condition. In its decision the
court faced the issue directly:
We therefore conclude that the Commission had authority to incorporate in the tendered license a condition which could operate to
impair the districts' full use of their irrigation water rights in some
future year. The likelihood that circumstances will occur during the
next twenty years which will, in fact, present such a problem seem
remote ....

But we now hold that the Commission has the legal

authority to take appropriate action restricting the use of such irrigation rights, should the occasion arise.43
A declaratory order issued in 1987 by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) for a proposed hydroelectric power project in California demonstrates continued adherence to the FirstIowa position. That
order stated:
The imposition of minimum flow releases for fishery protection and
other purposes is an integral part of the Commission's comprehensive
planning and licensing powers under Section 10(a) of the Federal
Power Act (FPA). As such, the establishment of minimum flows is
40. The project involved construction of a 205-foot dam on the nonnavigable Deschutes River,
cutting off the access of certain fish to their upstream spawning areas. Oregon law required proponents
of such projects to seek a permit from the Oregon Fish Commission conditioned upon construction
of a fish hatchery. The private applicant had devised other measures for protecting the fish which
had been approved by the Federal Power Commission. Id. at 449-52.
41. Id. at 444-45 (footnote omitted).
42. 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1965).
43. Id. at 924.
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a matter beyond the reach of state regulation. Allowing states to
prescribe minimum flows for licensed projects would interfere with
the Commission's balancing of competing considerations in licensing, such as fishery protection and project economics, and would
essentially vest a veto authority over projects in the states."
At issue was a decision by the California State Water Resources Control
Board setting minimum bypass flow requirements for the proposed project
at a higher level than those previously established by FERC.
The western states have argued that such licensing actions by FERC
disregard the traditional deference accorded the states in water matters.
Specifically, the Western States Water Council complains that FERC does
not require an applicant to have already obtained the necessary state water
rights before issuing the federal permit, that FERC imposition of minimum streamflow requirements is done without regard for state laws relating to such instream flows, and that in imposing such minimum flow
requirements FERC disregards possible effects on future upstream uses.4'
Federal Laws and Activities Primarily Related to Other Than
Water Development Purposes
Related to the Public Lands
Public lands reserved for specific purposes carry with them the right
to an amount of water necessary to fulfill the primary purposes of the
reservation.' These reserved water rights were found to exist originally
with respect to Indian reservations in the Winters case47 and were extended
to other reservations of federal lands in the 1963 Arizona v. California
decision.4 8 The date of priority for these water rights is established as of
the time the reservation is created. The major issues center on the extent
of these water rights (for example, water needed to fulfill the primary
purposes of the reservation) and the amount of water involved (for example, what quantity of water is needed to fulfill the primary purpose).
44. Rock Creek Limited Partnership, 38 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) § 61, 240 (Mar.
11,1987).
45. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission HydroelectricLicensingProceedings Related to State
Water Law, 1936: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong.
2nd Sess (1988) (statement by the Western States Water Council). See also the examples of conflicts
provided in testimony of A. Kenneth Dunn, Director, Idaho Department of Water Resources and
Larry Fasbender, Director, Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation, and the
Written Statement of Jim Jones, Attorney General, State of Idaho, to the Senate Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources, September 12, 1986.
46. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S.
128 (1976); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564

(1908).
47, 207 U.S. 564.
48. 373 U.S. at 601.
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In addition to these reserved rights, the Solicitor for the Department
of the Interior in 1979 asserted the existence of what were termed "nonreserved" water rights-federal appropriative water rights arising out of
the land management functions of the federal agencies. 9 These water
rights were asserted to exist independent of whether the public lands are
reserved or not. Unlike reserved rights, however, these rights would have
a priority date as of the date the water was first applied to use. These
rights were apparently based in the various congressional mandates charging federal agencies with management of the public lands, and the assertion of residual federal proprietary interests in the waters of the public
lands."0
The Krulitz Opinion was narrowed in January of 1981, and then
substantially rescinded in September of 1981."2 A thorough analysis of
this issue by the Department of Justice produced the following conclusion:
We believe that the history of federal-state relations with respect to
water rights in the western states and Congress' weighing of the
competing federal and state interests establish a presumption that is
directly opposite to that asserted by Solicitor Krulitz: in the absence
of evidence of specific congressional intent to preempt state water
laws, the presumption is that federal agencies can acquire water rights
only in accordance with state law. The mere assignment of land
management functions to a federal agency, without more, does not
create any federal rights to unappropriated water necessary to carry
out those functions.' 3
This conclusion was then modified by the statement that "this presumption is rebuttable"' and "we do not believe it is appropriate to reach
a blanket conclusion that under existing federal statutes no implied federal
water rights exist except for federal reserved rights. "' Final determination
of the existence of such rights depends, the Olson Memorandum sug49. Federal Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of
Reclamation and Bureau of Land Management, 86 Interior Dec. 553 (1979) [hereinafter Krulitz

Opinion).
50. See the discussion in Federal "Non-Reserved" Water Rights, 6 Op. Off. Legal Council 328
(1962) [hereinafter Olson Memorandum).
51. Supplement to Solicitor Opinion No. M-36914 (Federal Water Rights of the National Park
Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation and Bureau of Land Management); 88
Interior Dec. 253 (198 1) (no federal non-reserved water rights assertable under FLPMA or the Taylor
Grazing Act).
52. Non-Reserved Water Rights-United States Compliance with State Law, 88 Interior Dec.
1055 (1981).
53. Olson Memorandum, supra note 50, at 332.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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gested, on a "careful examination of the individual federal statutes that
authorize management of those lands and their legislative history, and of
the potential conflicts that may be created by application of state laws."'56
At this point, then, the existence of these rights cannot be ruled out, but
they are certainly far more limited than initially asserted. If such rights
are found to exist, a number of issues regarding their relationship to
existing state law will have to be resolved.57
Federal laws governing access to and use of the public lands may
indirectly affect state water rights. Especially in the western states which
contain large areas of public lands, federal permission for rights-of-way
and other matters related to the construction of a water storage project is
commonly required. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA), for example, authorizes the granting of rights-of-way for "reservoirs, canals, ditches, flumes, laterals, pipes, pipelines, tunnels, and
other facilities and systems for the impoundment, storage, transportation,
or distribution of water."5 " FLPMA also authorizes the imposition of
terms and conditions in a right-of-way permit regarding such things as
wildlife and environmental protection and compliance with other federal
or state laws or standards. 9 The reach of this authority in affecting water
rights is unclear."

56. Id at 333. Congress has shown that it knows how to explicitly address water issues in relation
to public lands. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 577(b) (1985), which prohibits any "further alteration of the
natural water level of any lake or stream" in the Superior National Forest.
57. For example: What is their priority date? How are they quantified? What is their relationship
to already existing state-created water rights? What if the use being claimed is not recognized as
beneficial under state law?
58. 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a)(1) (1982).
59. 43 U.S.C. § 1765(a), (b) (1983) states: "Each right-of-way shall contain: (a) terms and
conditions which will ... (ii) minimize damage to scenic and aesthetic values and fish and wildlife
habitat and otherwise protect the environment; (iii) require compliance with applicable air and water
quality standards...; and (iv) require compliance with State standards ... if those standards are
more stringent than applicable Federal standards; and (b) such terms and conditions as the Secretary
deems necessary to . . . (v) require location of the right-of-way along a route that will cause least
damage to the environment, taking into consideration feasibility and other relevant factors ......
60. Implicit approval of the authority of the Forest Service to place limitations on water rights
may be found in Wyoming Wildlife Fed'n v. United States, 792 F. 2d 981 (10th Cir. 1986). Here
the Forest Service had granted an easement to the Cheyenne Board of Public Utilities to use lands
in Medicine Bow National Forest for construction of Stage II of the Cheyenne Water Division Project.
One of the conditions attached to the right-of-way approval involved the maintenance of minimum
stream flows by Cheyenne. Regarding this instream flow requirement the court stated: "The stream
flow requirements were clearly mandated by the Forest Service's own environmental impact statement, which states that the easement's stream flows levels are the minimum necessary to mitigate
damage to wildlife habitat." Id. at 986. Although not directly at issue in this case this language
suggests a clear recognition of the authority of the Forest Service to require minimum stream flows
. 43 U.S.C. § 1765 (a)
when needed to "minimize damage to ... fish and wildlife habitat ..
(1983).
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Related to Water Quality
The federal Clean Water Act6 establishes a national program of water
pollution control. Its major provisions prohibit the discharge of a pollutant
from a point source without a permit (§40 2 ),"2 require water pollution
from nonpoint sources to be remedied through broad-based area-wide
management plans (§208),63 and subject the discharge of dredged or fill
material into regulated waters to the permitting authority of the Army
Corps of Engineers (§404).' All of these provisions provide the potential
for federal regulatory control to affect private uses of water.
Concern about possible conflicts with traditional areas of state authority
are addressed in two provisions of the Clean Water Act. First, the Clean
Water Act states that: "Except as expressly provided in this chapter,
nothing in this chapter shall ...(2) be construed as impairing or in any
manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to
the waters (including boundary waters) of such States."'65 An amendment
(known as the Wallop Amendment) added to the goals and policy section
of the Clean Water Act in 1977 states:
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to allocate
quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded,
abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter. It is the further
policy of Congress that nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been
established by any State. Federal agencies shall co-operate with State
and local agencies to develop comprehensive solutions to prevent,
reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing
water resources.66
Much has been written about the many ways in which water quality
regulation could affect the availability of water for consumptive use.67 In
fact there has been surprisingly little direct conflict along these lines. At
the same time, it is increasingly evident that the indirect effects of water
61. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), ch. 758,62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (current
version at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (1982 and West Supp. 1988)).

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1982).
Id. § 1288(b)(2); Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4. Sec. 316, 101 Stat. 7,52.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (d) (1982).
id. § 1370.
Id. § 1251 (g).

67. See, e.g., Blumm, Wetlands Preservation, Fish and Wildlife Protection, and §404 Regulations: A Response, 18 LAND AND WATER L. REv. 469 (1983); Harrison & Woodruff, Accommodations
of the Appropriation Doctrine and Federal Goals Under Sections 208 and 404 of Public Law 92500 and Section /0 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 22 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 941
(1976); Hobbs & Raley, Water Quality Versus Water Quantity: A Delicate Balance, 34 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 24 (1988); MacDonnell, Water Rights Implications of Water Quality Regulations in
Colorado, in 1988 PROCEEDINGS, CONFERENCE ON WATER QUALITY CONTROL: INTEGRATING BENEF-
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quality considerations are making themselves felt in water rights decisions.
In National Wildlife Federationv. Gorsuch,6 8 the federal circuit court
ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) did not have to
issue section 402 permits for discharges from dams. The case turned on
whether such discharges were "pollutants" subject to control under the
Clean Water Act. In its brief discussion of section 101 (g) the court stated
that "we find specific indication in the Act that Congress did not want
to interfere any more than necessary with state water management, of
which dams are an important component."69
In Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews,7" another federal circuit
court pointed out that section 101(g), as a general policy statement,
"cannot nullify a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction, even if the
particular grant seems inconsistent with the broadly stated purpose.""1
Thus it is necessary to look to the Clean Water Act for "clear and specific"
requirements. At the same time, the court agreed that the 1977 amendment
indicated Congress' desire not to interfere with state water management
"any more than necessary." Thus, the court concluded: "A fair reading
of the statute as a whole makes it clear that, where both the state's interest
in allocating water and the federal government's interest in protecting the
environment are implicated, Congress intended an accommodation." 72
The Riverside case involved a plan to build a dam on a small tributary
of the South Platte River. The Fish and Wildlife Service objected to
construction of the dam because of possible effects on designated critical
habitat for the whooping crane over 250 miles downstream. The court
held that the project did not qualify for the special nationwide permit
status under section 404 and that "both the statute and the regulations
authorize the Corps to consider downstream effects of changes in water
quantity as well as on-site changes in water quality in determining whether
ICIAL USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, (Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado

School of Law); Muys, Quality vs. Quantity: The Federal Water Pollution Control Act's Quiet
Revolution in Western Water Rights Administration, 23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1013 (1977);
Parish & Morgan, History, Practiceand Emerging Problems of Wetlands Regulation: Reconsidering
§404 of the Clean WaterAct, 17 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 43 (1982); Robie, RelationshipsBetween
Water Qualityand Water Rights, in CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN WATER LAW 72 (1970); White,
The Emerging Relationship Between Environmental Regulation and ColoradoWater Law, 53 U, OF
COLO. L. REV. 597 (1982); Note, Water Law-When Water QuantityRegulation Is Not Water Quantity
Regulation, Riverside v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583 (D. Colo. 1983), 20 LAND AND WATER L. REV.
523 (1985).
68. 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
69. Id. at 178.
70. 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
71. Id. at 513 (quoting Connecticut Light and Power v. Federal Power Comm'n., 324 U.S. 515,

527 (1945)).
72. Id.
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a proposed discharge qualifies for a nationwide permit. "" Moreover, such
effects of changes in water quantity are not restricted to only direct effects
of the discharge, but extend to indirect effects as well. 4
In United States v. Akers," a federal circuit court upheld an injunction
preventing a California farmer from cultivating a wetlands area without
obtaining a section 404 permit. One of the issues considered by the court
was whether such regulation improperly interfered with state-allocated
water rights contrary to the intent of Congress as expressed in the Wallop
Amendment. The court quoted comments of Senator Wallop from the
legislative history of the Clean Water Act, including:
The requirements of section 402 and 404 permits may incidentally
affect individual water rights .... It is not the purpose of this amendment to prohibit those incidental effects. It is the purpose of this
amendment to insure that State allocation systems are not subverted,
and that effects on individual fights, if any, are prompted by legitimate and necessary water quality considerations.76
The court then added that "any incidental effect on Akers' rights to stateallocated water from the Pit River is justified because protection of Big
Swamp is the type of legitimate purpose for which the Act is intended.77
In United States v. State Water Resources Control Board,' the California Court of Appeals ruled that water rights in that state are clearly
subject to control as necessary to achieve federal and state water quality
standards. The State Water Resources Control Board in California has
responsibility both for determining appropriative water rights and for
formulating the state water quality control plan. The Board had amended
water use permits held by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and the California Department of Water Resources to require compliance with newly
formulated water quality standards. The major effect of the modifications
was to achieve protection of water quality (primarily the prevention of
salt water intrusion into the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta) by requiring
the permittees either to reduce their direct diversions or to make additional
releases of water from storage.79 The court approved this regulation of
water rights as the only effective mechanism available to protect water
quality in this situation.' Moreover, in considering arguments that mod73. Id. at 512.
74. Id.
75. 785 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 107 S.Ct. 107 (1986).
76. Id. at 821.
77. Id. (quoting Senate Debate, Dec. 5, 1977).
78. 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
79. Id. at 125 n.18, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 184 n.18.
80. The court stated: "In the absence of explicit legislative authority to regulate water users, the
principal enforcement mechanism available to the Board is its regulation of water rights to control
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ifications in permits to achieve revised water quality standards for protection of fish and wildlife were improper and would impair vested rights,
the court noted that the public trust doctrine, as enunciated in the Mono
Lake decision," gives the state "supervisory control over the state's waters
such that no party has a vested right to appropriate water in a manner
harmful to the interests protected by the public trust." 2
An emerging area of conflict concerns implementation of the antidegradation policy associated with the Clean Water Act. 3 EPA requires
states to include an antidegradation policy as part of their water quality
standards. This policy must assure that: (1) existing instream uses and
water quality necessary to protect such uses be maintained and protected;
(2) where the quality of water currently exceeds that necessary to support
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and recreation, such water
quality is to be maintained and protected unless, after intergovernmental
coordination and a public review process, it is determined that allowing
lower water quality (down to that necessary to protect existing uses) is
necessary to accommodate important economic or social development;
and (3) high quality waters in parks, refuges, and other special areas be
maintained and protected." Litigation is presently underway which should
help to define the reach of this requirement.
Related to Endangered Species Protection
The federal Endangered Species Act"5 provides a protection scheme
for threatened and endangered plant and animal species. Once listed, such
threatened and endangered species are protected against any federal actions likely to "jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or
threatened species . . . or result in the destruction or adverse modification
"6 Moreover, the "taking" of any enof habitat of such species ...
dangered species-defined to mean to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
diversions which cause degradation of water quality." Id. at 125, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 184 (emphasis

in original).
81. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr.
346 (1983).
82. State Water Resources Control Bd., at 149, 227 Cal. Rptr. 201. In a footnote the court noted
that the interests protected are "nonconsumptive, in-stream uses: navigation, fishing, recreation,
ecology, and aesthetics." Id. at 149 n.41, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 201 n.41.
83. There is no explicit antidegradation provision in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982), but the antidegradation policy promulgated by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) was effectively ratified by Congress in the Water Quality Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7. The EPA policy is found at Protection of the Environment 40,
C.F.R. § 131.12 (1988).
84. 40 C.FR. § 131.12 (1987).
85. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982).
86. id. § 1536(a)(2).
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conduct" 87 -is declared to be "unlawful for any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States. .. ""
The development of water resources often involves some kind of federal
action.89 This is especially true in the arid West where water development
is likely to affect protected species of fish and birds.'
In the celebrated case of Tennessee ValleyAuthority v. Hill,9 the United
States Supreme Court held that a major federal dam project could not be
completed because its operation would result in the extinction of the only

known population of an endangered species of fish, the snail darter. The
Court's very strong opinion established the Endangered Species Act as a
law with real teeth.92

For water development projects in the upper Colorado basin, a practice
has developed in which the project proponent must agree to certain mitigation measures in order to receive a "no jeopardy" opinion from the
Fish and Wildlife Service. Thus, for example, the Windy Gap project

was permitted to proceed in return for a contribution not to exceed $550,000
for habitat manipulation, monitoring, and research.9 3 This approach has

now been formalized as a proposed recovery program for endangered fish
species in this basin."
Because of concerns about whooping crane habitat along the Platte
River in Nebraska, the Fish and Wildlife Service has consistently opposed
any new water project development in the Platte basin. It has issued
jeopardy opinions for the Grayrocks project in Wyoming and the Narrows
and Wildcat projects in Colorado.9 5
In the Riverside case, already referenced because of the involvement
87. ld. § 1532(19).
88. Id. § 1538(a)(1)
89. The most common federal requirement is a § 404 permit. In the West a right-of-way permit
across federal lands often is involved. The federal government may be directly involved as in a
reclamation project. The full list of possible federal "actions" is lengthy.
90. For a discussion of endangered species problems arising from proposed and existing development within the Colorado River and Platte River basins see, L. MacDonnell, The Endangered

Species Act and Water Development Within the South Platte Basin,
RESEARCH REPORT SERIES, 1985.
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91. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
92. For example, the Court stated that "examination of the language, history, and structure of
the legislation under review here indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered species
to be afforded the highest of priorities." Id. at 174. Characterizing section 7 as an affirmative
"command" to federal agencies to insure that their actions do not jeopardize an endangered species,
the court added: "This language admits of no exception." Id. at 173.
93. Memorandum, Biological Opinion for Windy Gap Project, Colorado, from Regional Director,
Region 6, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to Regional Director, Lower Missouri Region Water and
Power Resources Service (Mar. 13, 1981). See also, L. MacDonnell, supra note 90, at 30-36.
94, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Recovery Implementation Program for Rare and Endangered
Fish Species in the Upper Colorado River Basin, Public Review Draft (Sept. 10, 1986) [hereinafter
Upper Colorado River Recovery Program]. This program will be discussed in more detail infra.
95. See L. MacDonnell, supra note 90. at 39-48.
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of a section 404 permit, a federal circuit court found that possible impacts
on designated critical habitat of the endangered whooping crane must be
considered by the Corps of Engineers in its permitting decision.' The
court stated:
The Endangered Species Act does not, by its terms, enlarge the
jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers under the Clean Water Act....
However, it imposes on agencies a mandatory obligation to consider
the environmental impacts of the projects that they authorize or
fund.97
Moreover, the court held that the project proponent has the burden of
that the proposed project would not jeopardize the whooping
proving
98
crane.

Another federal circuit court has found the Endangered Species Act to
be a positive source of authority for a decision by the Secretary of the
Interior to use all the water in a Bureau of Reclamation storage project
for the conservation of endangered species, rather than for its initially
intended municipal and industrial purposes." In the words of the court:
The Washoe Project Act anticipates but does not require the Secretary
to sell water to recover project construction costs .... ESA, on the
other hand, directs the Secretary to use programs under his control
for conservation purposes where threatened or endangered species
are involved. Following the directive, the Secretary here decided to
conserve the fish and not to sell the project's water. Given these
circumstances, the ESA supports the Secretary's decision to give
priority to the fish until such time as they no longer need ESA's
protection. "0o
Water development activities involving some federal action may be the
subject of a biological opinion by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to
determine if the action is likely to jeopardize a protected species. The
agency contemplating the action is to "consult" with the Fish and Wildlife
Service. ,' If a "negative" biological opinion is rendered (that is, a finding
is made that the action is likely to jeopardize a protected species) then
the Fish and Wildlife Service must suggest "reasonable and prudent
alternatives" to avoid such jeopardy. 2 Although the federal action agency
does not have to follow Fish and Wildlife Service recommendations, a
96. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
97. Id. at 512.
98. Id. at514.
99. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984).
100. Id. at 262.
101. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4) (1982).
102. Id. at § 1536(b)(3)(A).
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decision to act without regard to these recommendations must be supported by persuasive evidence."
Professor Tarlock has characterized the Endangered Species Act as
creating "regulatory property rights" in the federal government."o That
is because the "federal government now has a new basis to claim that
specific but undetermined amounts of water either be released from a
reservoir or not be impounded." " Whether these claims are characterized
as property rights or just as regulation, the clear effect is to cause possible
modification in the manner of exercise of state-created water rights.
INTEGRATING FEDERAL AND STATE INTERESTS IN WATER
There is little doubt that Congress could, if it chose, create a federal
system of water law completely displacing all existing state systems. In
certain areas such as control over navigation and licensing of hydroelectric
power facilities, the federal government has clearly exerted its preeminence. In general, however, efforts have been made to defer to state law
in matters of water allocation, distribution, and use. Numerous so-called
"savings clauses" or policy statements have been included in federal
legislation in which Congress indicates its intention not to interfere with
state water laws."6
Reference has already been made to such provisions in the Reclamation
Act, the Federal Power Act, and the Clean Water Act. The courts have
given somewhat different treatment to each of these provisions, apparently
according to the statutory language and the inferred congressional intent
in each case. 07 Analysis based on careful consideration of the relevant
statute is essential since the fundamental question is not the authority of
Congress to supersede state law but whether Congress so intended. In
this regard, federal-state conflicts in the water area are no different than
such conflicts in other areas. The Olson Memorandum provides a useful
103. See Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. US. Environmental Protection Agency,
684 F.2d 1041, 1049 (Ist Cir. 1982), in which the court stated: "Moreover, the legislative history
emphasizes that [clourts have given substantial weight to these biological opinions as evidence of
an agency's compliance with the Act.... and that a federal agency which proceeds with [an] action
in the face of inadequate knowledge or information .
does so with the risk that it has not satisfied
the standard of § 7(a)(2)."
104. Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights, 20 LAND AND WATER L.
REV, 1, 3 (1985).
105. Id. at 13.
106. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 n.5 (1978), where the court refers
to a 1964 Senate document listing 37 statutes "in which Congress has expressly recognized the
importance of deferring to state water law."
107, Compare the treatment of section 27 of the Federal Power Act in First Iowa Hydro-Electric
Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n. 328 US. 152, 175-78 (1946), with the treatment of Section 8 of
the Reclamation Act in California v,United States. 438 U.S. 645, 650 (1978),
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summary of factors to be considered in analysis of such conflicts:
the extent to which federal programs can be or have been adapted
to state law; the role played by the federal government, the significance of the federal interests at stake, and the risks to federal goals
and interests posed by application of state law; and the extent to
which application of federal rules will disrupt private expectations. "
As the court in the Riverside opinion pointed out, what is needed is
to find an "accommodation" of the federal and state interests.'°9 In the
first instance, the burden of making this accommodation is placed on the"
responsible federal agency: Bureau of Reclamation in the case of the
Reclamation Act; FERC in the case of the Federal Power Act; EPA and
the Corps of Engineers in the case of the Clean Water Act; and the Fish
and Wildlife Service in the case of the Endangered Species Act. To a
considerable degree, such accommodation will have to be worked out on
a case-by-case basis. On the federal side, it will be based on the directives
in the relevant legislation. Where those directives are very explicit, the
responsible federal agency will have little discretion in their implementation. To the degree possible, federal agencies should take into consideration factors such as those quoted from the Olson Memorandum in
determining the degree to which federal objectives can be achieved within
the framework of state law. Moreover, in the context of water it is certainly
relevant to recognize that Congress has attempted to minimize interference
with state water law. Thus it makes sense to attempt to achieve federal
objectives without such interference whenever possible.
Particularly in the hydroelectric power area, it seems that a reassessment of the manner in which FERC decisions are made is overdue. If
there ever was a case for the kind of absolute federal preemption of the
kind evidenced in the First Iowa situation, that justification no longer
exists. Just as the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the legitimacy of
state environmental regulation governing activities on the federal lands,""so
too should FERC recognize the legitimacy of state interests in water.
At the same time it is essential for the states to recognize that there is
nothing sacred about water rights as distinct from other kinds of property
rights. As Professor Tarlock has stated:
What seems to be emerging out of recent water adjudications is that
state-created water rights are not different from any other property
rights despite the vast energy dissipated by western water lawyers
to will a contrary result. Thus, state water rights are not immune
108. Olson Memorandum, supra note 50, at 77.
109. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F2d 508, 513 (10th Cir. 1985).
110. California Coastal Comm'n v,Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987).
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from the retroactive application of state police power or of federal
constitutional authority. " '
Professor Tarlock goes on to argue that while "it is legitimate for the
federal government to claim water rights under [the Endangered Species
Act and the Clean Water Act]," integration of federal and state interests
"should take place by the least intrusive means available to the federal
agency."" 2 He explains:
For instance, flow maintenance that potentially conflicts with a state
allocation pattern should be a preservation strategy of last resort.
This is the correct meaning of the oft cited but much abused principle
of federal deference to state water law. It remains proper for the
courts to scrutinize the effects of federal law on long established
state-created property rights. But, in light of its history, deference
is not an excuse for the failure of states to recognize legitimate federal
interests asserted in light of changing policies in the use of our
resources. II
Recent experience in the efforts to achieve accommodation of federal,
state, and private interests with respect to protection of endangered fish
species in the upper Colorado River basin is instructive. Dissatisfaction
with the so-called "Windy Gap" approach discussed earlier'." brought
the Fish and Wildlife Service together with: representatives of the states
of Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming; the Bureau of Reclamation; the water
development community; and the environmental community. After two
years of intensive effort, a proposed "recovery plan" has been developed.
Water needed to protect and recover the species is to be "appropriated,
or acquired, and administered pursuant to State law and will, therefore,
be legally protected as any water right under State laws.""' In other
words, instream flows established to protect the endangered fish are to
be administered within the state systems and not as a separate federal
program."6 Water is to be provided from existing Bureau of Reclamation
projects and from acquisition of water rights using funding to be provided
11I.Tarlock, supra note 104, at 17.
112. Id. at 29.
113. Id.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
115. Upper Colorado River Recovery Program, supra note 94, at 4-3.
116. To make this possible the Utah legislature passed a law in 1986 permitting the Division of
Wildlife Resources to acquire and hold instream flow rights, for protection of fisheries which would
be administered by the State Engineer. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3(7) (Supp. 1986). The instream
flow program is narrowly described. Instream flows cannot be created through direct appropriations
or by condemnation of water rights. Acquisition of existing water rights for instream flow purposes
requires legislative approval. See also Morgan, Utah's New Authority for Instream Flow Appropriations, in INSTREAM FLOWS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST, THIRD ANNUAL WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL
WATER MANAGEMENT SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS (September 11-12, 1986) 197-201.
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by Congress. Project proponents still must make a one-time payment to
the recovery program based on the average annual flow depletion attributed to the project. ' However, the Fish and Wildlife Service will no
longer consider project-related depletion effects as further jeopardizing
the protected species."' Nondepletion impacts will still be subject to
Section 7 review. As stated in the Draft Program:
Through this approach, depletion impacts of proposed water and
water-related projects would not likely jeopardize endangered species
if the program is implemented and project proponents participate in
and contribute toward conservation measures under this program.
Nondepletion impacts (direct impacts) of water projects such as those
caused by construction, inundation, or temperature modifications
resulting from reservoir releases will, however, still be subject to
implementation of alternatives or recommendations to offset such
impacts pursuant to Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act." 9
In addition to the provision of instream flows, the recovery program
also includes other efforts at habitat management and improvement such
as increasing population through stocking, protecting endangered species
through management of nonnative fish, and improving research and monitoring activities. A "Recovery Implementation Committee," comprised
of representatives from the federal agencies, the three states, water development interests, and conservation organizations, is to assure that the
recovery plan is fully developed and implemented. Apparently this committee is to recommend "protection strategies" including acquisition of
water for instream flows. In addition to the need to obtain the necessary
funding, it appears that much of the success of this effort will depend on
the ability of this committee to agree on appropriate measures of protection.
This recovery program represents more than two years of hard bargaining among federal, state, and private interests. While still a long way
from being implemented, it sets forth a concrete program for achieving
the dominant federal objective (recovery of endangered species of fish)
while accommodating state concerns about maintaining control of their
water rights systems as well as the concerns of water development and
conservation interests. An attorney who represents water development
interests has said:
We had heard in the past that federal intervention under section 7 of
the Endangered Species Act, federal appropriation of water, or federal
117.

The rate is $10 per acre-foot, inflation adjusted.
118. Depletion effects include flow reduction and correspond-ing changes in temperature, salinity,
and turbidity.
119. Upper Colorado River Recovery Program, supra note 94 at I-1i.
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regulation of releases through permitting was the only way to protect
these species. We now have the environmental community looking
to see whether we can integrate streamflow protection of fish and
wildlife into the Colorado water rights system. It is much better to
have protection under the state water rights system for such values
than it is to rely on a project-by-project decision-making process, as
in Riverside, where you pretend that water released from the Wildcat
site will travel 260 miles downstream past all of the ground water
pumpers in Nebraska and reach the whooping crane habitat,"
In the context of the Colorado River, he might have added that the Utah
legislature also was persuaded that a limited version of instream flow
protection should be permitted under Utah water law.' 2
SUMMARY
The increasingly pervasive role of federal laws and activities is evident
in all aspects of society. Water is no exception. As a general matter,
congressional policy has been to permit state law to govern matters relating to water rights. This policy has been accorded special deference
under the Reclamation Act in substantial part because the reclamation
program is more a state-assistance program than a federal program. On
the other hand, where the congressional intent is more clearly directed
at establishing a federal program--as for example, in the comprehensive
development of river basins for hydroelectric and other purposes--deference to state law has been less noticeable.
More recently, federal laws have been established directed at achieving
national environmental protection objectives. These laws typically were
passed with little, if any, regard for effects on state water law. The result
of bringing such conflicts to Congress's attention has been policy statements urging deference and cooperation but no real change in the laws.
Their substantive provisions are to be implemented irrespective of any
incidental effects on state water laws.
In fact, much of the conflict in recent years has turned on federal
desires to achieve certain environmental protection objectives and state
desires to control decisions about how property interests are affected.
From the federal standpoint, it should not matter greatly how the environmental protection objectives are reached (unless, of course, Congress
has specified a particular approach). Given the special and largely legit120. Hobbs, Innovative Water Management Workshop, in TRADITION,
PERSPECTIVES ON COLORADO WATER LAW,

INNOVATION, AND CONFLICr:

227 (MacDonnell ed. 1987).

121. See supra note 116, Although not directly the outcome of these negotiations, the state of
Wyoming also adopted an instream flow program for the first time in 1986. Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§413-1001 to -1014 (Supp. 1986).
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imate state concerns about water, it makes sense to look for ways to
achieve objectives without affecting state water rights whenever possible.
Those objectives requiring water should be achieved by working within
the state water law system whenever possible. If, however, water is
necessary and the existing state system does not permit or frustrates the
needed federal action, state law most likely will have to give way.
To maintain control of their systems of water law, states must be willing
to modify their laws to adapt to the changes being mandated by federal
laws.' 2 Federal need for water to satisfy requirements under laws such
as the Endangered Species Act may be met through state managed instream flow programs. Water quality issues are more complex but cannot
be resolved by pretending that water quality objectives can be achieved
without affecting existing water rights. A more comprehensive and cooperative approach, such as the Upper Colorado River Recovery Plan,
may be necessary in some instances to resolve difficult problems involving
a number of parties. As Professor Wilkinson has noted:
State domination of water policy, then, has been grudgingly eroded,
in fits and starts, on a number of fronts. We have developed, and
will hold to, a policy matrix that recognizes a set of legitimate state
interests in the allocation of water, but that also accommodates larger
national interests including the need of downstream states and nations, water quality, recreation, the environment, and Indian tribes." 3
If the states want to maintain control of their systems of water law, they
will have to recognize these fundamental changes.

122. Not discussed in this paper, but clearly related to this point, is the impact on state control
of water coming out of the interstate commerce implications of the 1982 Supreme Court decision
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941.
123. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 317, 327 (1985).

